




X O S É M . N Ú Ñ E Z S E I X A S
Ethno-nationalist exiles in the interwar period were a unique species. While some of them
relied on their own diasporic networks and waited for a chance, others established agitation
platforms and regarded themselves as an alternative International of the ‘oppressed peoples’.
Most of these alliances ended in failure, as it proved extremely difficult to reconcile the demands
stemming from divergent national claims, such as those of autonomist factions versus irredentist
or pro-independence groups, or those of national minorities seeking reintegration into their
motherland as opposed to groups seeking independence. This article explores the relationship
between minority nationalist exiles and anti-fascism by focusing on three issues: the emergence
and evolution of ‘international alliances’ of minority activists in interwar Europe; contacts and
ideological exchanges between ethno-nationalist exiles and liberal and anti-fascist segments of
European public opinion and, finally, the emergence of a transnational anti-fascist nationality
theory.
In the aftermath of the First World War state borders in east-central Europe were
redrawn at the Paris Peace Conference. The armed conflicts that subsequently
broke out between various successor states, along with the progression of the
Russian Civil War, forced dozens of ethno-nationalist activists into exile. Those
belonging to national and ethnic minorities could easily find refuge in their respective
‘motherlands’, from Weimar Germany to post-Trianon Hungary. They created
networks of political and cultural associations that served as the bases for stirring
up irredentism, with official state support and often also with the collaboration of
large portions of the homeland’s revisionist and nationalist parties. These activists
were joined by many other ethno-nationalists with no motherland, who took refuge
in former imperial centres such as Vienna and Berlin, as well as Paris, London
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and Geneva. The latter acquired new visibility when the League of Nations was
established there in 1920. All these cities became centres of agitation for ethno-
nationalist émigrés, who tried to influence neutral public opinion in favour of their
respective causes.
Many (ethno-)nationalist exiles were not anti-fascists. On the contrary, many
came under the influence of integralist visions of the nation, and were subsequently
seduced by fascism. In their eyes, fascist Italy and afterwards Nazi Germany seemed
to incarnate the best of values such as the cult of the nation, while upholding a
strong anti-communist stance. In fact, ethno-nationalist exiles were identified by the
earliest fascists as possible allies for challenging the Versailles settlement. The poet
and pilot Gabriele D’Annunzio had already planned to set up a league of ‘oppressed
peoples’ on the occasion of the occupation of Fiume in 1919. He saw the inhabitants
of the Italian irredenta as potential members of a new coalition of European, Asian
and African peoples that included the Irish, Flemish, Egyptians, Macedonians and
more.1 Other exiles found inspiration in the Marxist-Leninist approach to national
liberation and were fascinated by the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union. In fact,
Moscow became at times a pole of attraction for non-communist nationalist émigrés
seeking external support, and communist parties embraced until 1934 the doctrine
of Bolshevik self-determination, which was intended to destroy the capitalist states.2
All this created after 1945 an image of ethno-nationalist émigrés as troublemakers and
fellow travellers into fascism. Their allegiance to the ethnic concept of the nation led
them to take strategic risks, or simply seal unholy alliances with fascist powers.3
New ethno-nationalist exiles appeared in the 1920s and 1930s. These included
Catalan, Basque, Galician, Sardinian, South Tyrolean and Slovene exiles from Spain
and Italy, alongside groups of Irish political exiles in the early 1920s (particularly
Sinn Féin activists and later on Irish Republican Army members). These were even
accompanied by nationalist activists from the distant peripheries of the British, French
and Dutch empires (India, Vietnam, Indonesia), who frequently interacted with
European ethno-nationalists.4 This latter group generally remained committed to
democracy – some even leaned towards communism – and were much less susceptible
1 See Michael Ledeen, The First Duce. D´Annunzio at Fiume (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1977), 176–86; Leone Kochnitzky, La Quinta Stagione o i Centauri di Fiume (Bologna: Zanichelli,
1922), 141–68.
2 See for a recent reappraisal Martin Mevius, ed., The Communist Quest for National Legitimacy in Europe,
1918–1989 (London: Routledge, 2011). The case of the radical Catalan nationalist Francesc Macià, who
travelled to Moscow in 1925, provides one example of the strategic seeking out of Soviet Union support.
Macià hoped that the Soviets would support Catalonian independence, thanks to the mediation of
some Catalan communists who worked within the Comintern: see Enric Ucelay-Da Cal and Joan
Esculies, Macià als país dels soviets (Barcelona: Edicions del 1984, 2015).
3 See for example Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace & Co.,
1979), 270–80; John A. Armstrong, ‘Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant
in Eastern Europe’, Journal of Modern History, 40, 3 (1968), 396–410; Robert Arzalier, Les perdants. La
dérive fasciste des mouvements autonomistes et indépendantistes au XXe siècle (Paris: Ed. la Découverte, 1990).
4 See Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Harald Fischer-Tiné, ‘Indian Nationalism and the “world
forces”: transnational and diasporic dimensions of the Indian freedom movement on the eve of the First
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to the ‘lure’ of fascism than their eastern European counterparts. Finally, the leaders
of Jewish minorities in east-central Europe constituted another faction.
Ethno-nationalist exiles in the interwar period were a unique species. While some
of them relied on their own diaspora networks, established transatlantic relations with
their fellow countrymen in the Americas and simply waited for a chance to be heard,
others established agitation platforms during the 1920s and regarded themselves as an
alternative International of the ‘oppressed peoples’ against the old established states
and the new ‘nationalising states’ of east-central Europe. Most of these alliances ended
in failure, partly due to the extreme internal heterogeneity of their members. It proved
extremely difficult to reconcile the diverse demands stemming from divergent national
claims, such as those of autonomist factions versus irredentist or pro-independence
groups, or those of national minorities seeking reintegration into their motherland
as opposed to groups seeking independent recognition of their nationalities.5
This article explores the nature and limitations of the difficult relationship
between minority nationalism and anti-fascism among these ethno-nationalist exiles
by focussing on: a) the emergence and evolution of ‘international alliances’ of
minority activists in interwar Europe, b) contacts and ideological exchanges between
ethno-nationalist activists in Paris and London and liberal and anti-fascist segments
of European public opinion and c) the emergence of a transnational anti-fascist
nationality theory.
I
(Ethno-)nationalist émigrés had existed throughout the nineteenth century, from
the Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi and his fellow leaders of risorgimento nationalism to
Greek, Romanian and Bulgarian exiles in London and Paris, Irish nationalists in
the United States and Polish émigrés in Paris. Until the end of the nineteenth
century, these exiles were overwhelmingly liberal or republican oriented. The
followers of Mazzini’s Giovine Italia (1831) attracted Irish, Polish, Serbian and other
central European émigrés, who also founded similar organisations.6 Although they
advocated international cooperation to meet the objectives of liberal revolutions
all over the continent, they all believed in the nation as having a supreme value
and considered statehood or autonomy for their homelands as a main goal of their
World War’, Journal of Global History, 2 (2007), 325–44 and Kate O’Malley, Ireland, India and Empire.
Indo-Irish Radical Connections, 1919–64 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008).
5 For a general overview, see Heiner Timmermann, ed., Nationalismus und Nationalbewegung in Europa,
1914–1945 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999); Ugo Corsini and Davide Zaffi, eds., Die Minderheiten
zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997); Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, Entre
Ginebra y Berlín. La cuestión de las minorías nacionales y la política internacional en Europa, 1914–1939
(Madrid: Akal, 2001); Mathias Beer and Stefan Dyroff, eds., Politische Strategien nationaler Minderheiten
in der Zwischenkriegszeit (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014).
6 See Ronald Cunsolo, Italian Nationalism: From its Origins to World War Two (New York: Praeger, 1989),
18–9 and 58–60. On the transnational circulation of nationalist tenets in the 19th century, see Joop
Leerssen, National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press,
2006).
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political agitation. This was, in fact, a collateral aspect of the ‘transnational political
culture’ of nineteenth-century liberalism.
However, from the beginning of the twentieth century until the eve of the First
World War, in great European capitals such as London and Paris new alliances emerged
between nationalist émigrés and the British, Swiss and French liberal left. Some
republicans and radical liberals, many of them professional opinion makers, journalists
and academics, enthusiastically advocated the right to self-determination of European
(and occasionally even non–European) nationalities. They criticised the oppression of
national minorities and stateless nations within multinational empires, particularly the
Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian domains, and established close links between the full
democratisation of Europe, the preservation of peace and the satisfaction of national
and territorial demands all over Europe. Certainly, British ‘champions of nationalities’
were more eager to accept self-determination for, say, Bohemia than for Ireland. Their
French counterparts firmly believed that France was nationally and ethnically homo-
geneous; thus, as a full-fledged democratic nation it was entitled to raise the banner of
self-determination. Macedonian, Croatian, Armenian, Lithuanian and other émigrés
managed to establish some connections with broader segments of French and English
public opinion through liberal associations such as anti-slavery societies. These and
other associations had positioned themselves at the origins of organisations such as
the Human Rights League (Ligue des Droits de l’Homme), the Fabian Society and
several peace associations that attempted to establish a transnational network.7
Alongside defence of worldwide peace, tolerance, international cooperation and
human equality, western European intellectuals and politicians became firm defenders
of the rights of ‘oppressed nationalities’, though generally limiting self-determination
to ‘civilised’ peoples. Émigrés did not always share this political agenda, as they were
far more interested in national freedom and external support for their cause. In this
aspect, a fundamental contradiction emerged. The ‘champions of nationalities’ were
motivated by altruistic liberalism, rejection of ‘backward’ multinational empires and
the search for a new international order based on the peaceful coexistence of races
and nations. However, ethno-nationalist activists were generally searching for strategic
allies among those who embraced their cause, regardless of their political orientation
and strategic aims. This implied a high degree of opportunism: émigrés were positive
toward anyone who could carry their claims into the international arena and provide
them with access to the ministries of foreign affairs of the great powers. This emerged
clearly during the First World War and became the norm among nationalist exiles
after 1918. Being heard in the emerging sphere of international public opinion also
became a parallel objective for political and intellectual representatives of ‘oppressed’
nationalities. This had been expressed earlier in the emergence of international
platforms such as the Union des Nationalités (1912), an initiative founded in Paris by
7 Jean M. Guieu, Le rameau et le glaive. Les militants français pour la SDN (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po,
2008); David Cortright, Peace. A History of Movements and Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008), 58–69; Thomas Davies, NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014).
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some exiled Lithuanians, Jewish Zionists and other nationalist émigrés from eastern
Europe, shortly after meeting one year earlier at the Universal Race Congress held
in London. At the Congress the founder of the initiative, the Lithuanian exile Jean
Gabrys, had also met the French journalist, René Pélissier, who was committed to
the cause of oppressed peoples and who would work later for the French information
services. Gabrys and Pélissier also attracted some Irish and Catalan nationalists and
enjoyed the support of British writers and journalists, along with prominent French
intellectuals such as the historian Charles Seignobos.8
Political contradictions between the two groups of actors became evident during
the First World War. Both sides, but especially the Entente, presented the conflict
as a war to liberate the small nations oppressed and invaded by the central powers.
This strategy opened certain doors in the foreign ministries in London, Paris and
Washington for ethno-nationalist émigrés from the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman
empires (although nationalist exiles from the Caucasus and the Baltic countries first
attempted to win German support for their cause). They founded committees to
carry out propaganda activities in Paris and London but preferred neutral soil,
particularly in Switzerland. The first priority was to locate allies among the public
opinion makers of the countries whose support they targeted, as well as lobbyists
with the staffs of their ministries of foreign affairs. Academics, journalists, writers
and intellectuals were sought to inform the British, French and US governments on
matters related to east and central European nationalities.9 US President Woodrow
Wilson enhanced the legitimacy of nationality claims in 1917. The presentation of his
‘Fourteen Points’ programme and their international diffusion gave some groups of
ethno-nationalist émigrés new opportunities for proto-diplomatic agitation, which
was now rhetorically reinforced by their appeal to Wilsonian principles. A good
example were the Czech leaders Tomás Masaryk and Edvard Beneš, who, moreover,
saw their access to the British Foreign Office facilitated by influential mediators who
endorsed their cause, such as the historians Robert Seton-Watson and Edward H.
Carr, as well as the journalist Wickham Steed. These mediators played the card of the
Entente’s support for the unsatisfied nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as
a means of exerting pressure on the Vienna government to sign a separate peace with
the Entente.10
8 Charles Seignobos, Les tendances autonomistes en Europe (Paris: Alcan, 1913); Jean Gabrys, Auf Wache für
die Nation – Erinnerungen, E. Demm, ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: PL Acad. Research, 2013); Georges-Henri
Soutou, ‘Jean Pélissier et l’Office Central des Nationalités, 1911–1918: Un agent du gouvernement
français auprés des nationalités’, in idem, ed., Recherches sur la France et le problème des nationalités pendant
la premiére guerre mondiale (Pologne. Ukraine, Lithuanie) (Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne,
1995), 13–38.
9 See the fascinating account by Hugh Seton-Watson and Christopher Seton-Watson, The Making of
a New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the Last Days of Austria-Hungary (London: Methuen, 1981);
as well as Erik Goldstein, Winning the Peace: British diplomatic strategy, peace planning, and the Paris
Peace Conference 1916–1920 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) and Lawrence E. Gelfand, The
Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917–1919 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963). For a
comprehensive account, see Núñez Seixas, Entre Ginebra y Berlín, 42–6.
10 See Derek Heater, National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and his Legacy (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1994); Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe; Frank Hadler, ed., Weg
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Nevertheless, the final break-up of European multi-ethnic empires can certainly
not be solely considered an outcome achieved by the direct influence of nationalist
émigrés. They benefited from particularly favourable geopolitical circumstances and,
finally, from the refusal of the Austro-Hungarian government to abandon its alliance
with Germany and sign a separate peace treaty with the Entente. Ethno-nationalist
exiles could rely on a robust propaganda network abroad and on mediators in the
state diplomatic corps, who were ultimately responsible for tracing the new borders.
The academic advisers of the main delegations, who drew the new map of Europe
at the Paris Peace Conference, were influenced to some extent by émigrés. The
representatives of the Jewish minorities in Paris, in particular the British journalist
Lucien Wolf, also played an important role in agitating for minority protection.
The Minority Treaties, first imposed on Poland in 1919, were soon extended to all
minorities ‘of race, language and religion’ in the new nationalising successor states
of east-central Europe and the Middle East. This established the framework for an
international system of minorities protection under the umbrella of the League of
Nations.11
The elites of nationalist movements in Europe saw proto-diplomatic agitation
in times of global turmoil as an important element for more effectively attaining
their objectives.12 However, not all émigrés enjoyed similar opportunities. Irish and
Indian nationalists sent delegations to Paris but were not allowed to present their
claims at the Peace Conference because during the Great War they had opposed the
eventual winners. Something similar happened with several political groupings from
Catalonia, Brittany, Scotland and the Basque Country, all of whom attempted to
send memorandums to the various delegations at the Peace Conference.13 Even so,
von Österreich! Das Weltkriegsexil von Masaryk und Benes im Spiegel ihrer Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus den
Jahren 1914–1918. Eine Quellensammlung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995).
11 For a relatively recent reappraisal of the Peace Conference, see Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers: the
Paris Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to End War (London: Murray, 2003). For the role of Jewish
organisations, see Mark Levene, War, Jews and the New Europe (London: Oxford University Press /The
Littman Library, 1992), as well as Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of Others. The Great Powers, the
Jews, and international minority protection, 1878–1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004),
David Engel, ‘Minorities Treaties’, in The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2008), vol. 2, 1176–77 and Simon Rabinovitch, Jewish Rights, National Rites:
Nationalism and Autonomy in Late Imperial and Revolutionary Russia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2014), 258–71.
12 See, e. g., the reflection by the Catalanist leader Antoni Rovira i Virgili, ‘Necessitat de que tot
nacionalisme tingui una política internacional’, Revista Anyal, 1915, reproduced in D. Martínez Fiol,
ed., El catalanisme i la Gran Guerra. Antologia (Barcelona: La Magrana/Diputació de Barcelona, 1988),
79–85. On the concept of proto-diplomacy, see Ivo Duchacek, ‘Perforated Sovereignties: Towads a
Typology of New Actors in International Relations’, in Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos,
eds., Federalism and International Relations. The Role of Subnational Units (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990),
1–32; as well as Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating, eds., Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign
Relations of Subnational Governments (London: Frank Cass, 1999).
13 Stephen Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants. The Little Nations at Versailles (Port Washington, NY: Kemikat
Press, 1969); S. de Gasquet, ‘La France et les mouvements nationaux ukrainiens’, in Soutou, ed.,
Recherches, 172–83; Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, Internacionalitzant el nacionalisme. El catalanisme polític i la
qüestió de les minories nacionals a Europa (1914–1936) (Valencia: Afers/Universitat de València, 2010),
75–82.
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the example of ethno-nationalists who succeeded in achieving their objectives after
1918 – thanks in part to proto-diplomacy – influenced the strategies of those who
sought to follow in their footsteps. They learned the compulsory nature of setting
up propaganda bureaus in the greatest European capitals; they presented their claims
in multilingual brochures and journals to influence an actor that supposedly became
relevant after 1918 – international public opinion –; they sought to gain the support
of intellectuals, journalists and influential elites in London, Vienna, Paris, Berlin or
Geneva and they established what amounted to a permanent siege of the fledgling
League of Nations.
II
From the mid-1920s onwards, two varieties of ethno-nationalist émigrés consciously
– but with some nuances – raised the banner of anti-fascism and attempted to
combine an agenda of national liberation (or at least of gaining political recognition
of collective rights for their territories) with opposition to fascist regimes.
The first was a faction that stemmed from ethnic parties in Italy after the rise of
Mussolini to power. It included some leaders of the powerful Sardinian autonomist
movement that had emerged in 1918, as well as representatives of the German-
speaking South Tyrolean minority and Slovenes from Gorizia, on the Italian-Yugoslav
border. One example was Josip Vilfan, a lawyer from Trieste and former deputy
in the Italian parliament in Rome. Until his exile to Vienna in 1928 he was a
moderate who, along with the other Slovene deputies from Gorizia-Trieste, aimed at
a fruitful collaboration with the Italian majority and even demonstrated a willingness
to come to terms with the fascist government.14 Unlike Sardinians, who opted
for joining Italian anti-fascist platforms and subordinated home-rule aspirations to
the restoration of democracy in Italy, exiled Slovene and South Tyrolean leaders
gave priority to defending their respective motherlands within the framework of
European alliances. This strategy found resonance in German revisionism, which
sponsored committees of fellow countrymen established in Germany and Austria,
with the objective of agitating for the incorporation of South Tyrol into German
territory.
Catalan, Basque and Galician ethno-nationalist exiles from Spain constituted a
second category. They had been forced to leave their country during the Primo
de Rivera dictatorship (1923–30) and again after the rebel victory in the Spanish
Civil War (1936–39), which put an end to the Second Spanish Republic. During the
second half of the 1920s Catalan émigrés were especially active in France, Belgium
and Latin America. However, they were politically very fragmented and followed
divergent strategies. Conservative and moderate Catalanists in exile attempted to
present Catalonia as a ‘national minority’ not covered by the Minority Treaties. They
14 See Claus Gatterer, Im Kampf gegen Rom. Bürger, Minderheiten und Autonomien in Italien, Vienna: Europa
Verlag, 1968, 390–450; Joze Pirjevec, ‘Die politische Theorie und Tätigkeit Josef Wilfans’, in Corsini
and Zaffi (eds.), Die Minderheiten, 167–74.
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denounced the oppression of the Catalan language and culture by the dictatorship
as a violation of the rights granted to ethnic minorities, hoping to force the League
of Nations to intervene. They prioritised peaceful strategies – or, as the right-wing
Catalanist intellectual and deputy Joan Estelrich put it, the path of the Law – in
an attempt to mobilise European public opinion in favour of the Catalan cause
and attract the attention of the League of Nations.15 Catalanist moderate exiles
established some links with French liberals and regionalists in the French Regionalist
Federation (Fédération Régionaliste Française). Their connections were expressed in
the journal Le Courrier Catalan, which was published in Paris from 1924 to 1926. It
opposed any form of dictatorship in southern Europe and advocated the peaceful
democratisation and decentralisation of Spain. An autonomous Catalonia could
then play an active role in European politics, as an avant-garde of democracy and
Europeanism.16
Catalan left-wing and radical nationalists found support among Catalan immigrants
in France and among some groups of Italian anti-fascists in exile, particularly
the garibaldini. They were named after their leader, Garibaldi’s grandson Riciotti
Garibaldi (who later turned out to be an informant for Mussolini’s secret police)
and saw their Catalan counterparts as allies in the effort to topple the Mediterranean
dictatorships. Other relevant allies among the nationalist émigrés and representatives
in Paris included the Irish Bureau, the Committee of Jewish Delegations (Comité
des Délégations Juives) and certain German representatives of the later Congress of
European Nationalities, founded in 1925 (see below). The Estat Català group, led by
the former colonel of the Spanish Army Francesc Macià, represented the separatist-
revolutionary faction of Catalan émigrés. They were the first to propose the creation
of a League of Oppressed Nations that would bring together Irish, Galicians, Basques
and anti-colonial nationalists.17
From 1925 onwards Macià gave priority to a mixture of proto-diplomatic pressure
and violent insurrectional tactics that mirrored the Irish group Sinn Féin, which he
greatly admired. After a failed attempt at invading Catalonia from southern France
in November 1926, dozens of radical Catalan militiamen who had the support of
certain Italian anti-fascist groups were arrested before they could cross the border
in the Pyrenees. Meanwhile, radical Catalan exiles followed a parallel strategy of
mobilising public opinion against the Spanish dictatorship. They established close
links to the French liberal and left-wing internationalists grouped around the Human
Rights League, such as the flamboyant trial lawyer Henry Torrès, a communist activist
who had taken up the defence in the trial of Macià, Riccioti Garibaldi and their
followers in January 1927. In a famous trial nine months later, Torrès also defended
15 See Joan Estelrich, La qüestió de les minories nacionals i les vies del Dret (Barcelona: Catalònia, 1929).
16 For an extensive analysis, see Núñez Seixas, Internacionalitzant el nacionalisme, 115–21.
17 See Ucelay-Da Cal, ‘Estat Català. The Strategies of Separation and Revolution of Catalan Radical
Nationalism, 1919–1933’, Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1979, 226–32; G. Cattini, Nel nome di
Garibaldi. I rivoluzionari catalani, i nipoti del Generale e la polizia di Mussolini (1923–1926) (Pisa: BFS
Edizioni, 2010).
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the Jewish Ukrainian anarchist Sholom Schwartzbard, who had killed the Ukrainian
nationalist leader Simon Petliura in Paris.18
III
The emergence of an international system for protection of minorities under the legal
umbrella of the League of Nations added to the newly-acquired legitimacy of the
nationality principle among broad sectors of organised public opinion in Britain and
France.19 Liberal and pacifist associations such as the Human Rights League and the
League of Nations Union helped shape a transnational space that gave a platform to
the claims of representatives of national minorities. At least four partially overlapping
international networks articulated that space.
The first was the international League of Nations movement, supported by
left-wing and liberal associations in the most important European and American
countries. Their social impact was uneven in the various parts of Europe. In
several countries, notably Britain, the League of Nations Unions enjoyed widespread
social support and truly reflected civil society. In other states, such as Germany,
they were mostly supported by the government and amalgamated naïve pacifists,
radical democrats and liberals along with representatives of Protestant churches, all
of whom sought to establish a new international order.20 Before the consolidation
of the minorities protection system at the League of Nations, there were attempts
at founding international committees for the defence of the ‘peoples’ rights’. For
example, the International Bureau for the Protection of Human Rights (Bureau
International pour la Défense du Droit des Peuples) was active in Geneva between 1920
and 1922. Though presumably sponsored by the Polish government, it was directed
by Swiss journalist René Claparède, who had been engaged in the pacifist movement.
In theory, the Bureau sought to uphold the cause of national minorities within the
framework of human rights and participated in the first meetings of the international
League of Nations movement.21
18 See Saul S. Friedman, Pogromchik: The Assassination of Simon Petlura (New York: Hart, 1976). On
Macià’s and Garibaldi’s defence by Torrès, see also E. Ucelay-Da Cal, Francesc Macià. Una vida en
imatges (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 1984), 113–18, as well as the contemporary account by
Louis Santini, Garibaldi, Mussolini et Cie (Paris: Librairie Baudinière, 1926).
19 There is a huge amount of bibliography on the system of protection of minorities implemented by
the League of Nations. As a whole, the League of Nations has recently been reappraised from a more
positive perspective, seen not only as a failure. See, for instance, Peter Hilpold, ‘The League of Nations
and the Protection of Minorities – Rediscovering a Great Experiment’, Max Planck Yearbook of United
Nations Law, 17 (2013), 87–12.
20 See Luca dei Sabelli, Nazione e minoranze etniche, Bologna: Zanichelli, 1929, vol. II, 179; Núñez Seixas,
Entre Ginebra y Berlín, 204–45; Marta Petricioli and Donatella Cherubini, eds., Pour la paix en Europe.
Institutions et société civile dans l’entre-deux-guerres (Berne: Peter Lang, 2007).
21 ‘L’Assemblée de la Société des Nations à Genève et le droit des peuples’, Le Droit des Peuples, 5 (1920);
René Claparède, L’ Organisation de la Lutte pour la Liberté des Peuples (Geneva: Publications du Bureau
International pour la Défense des Droits des Peuples, 1921).
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National minorities activists soon discovered that founding League of Nations
associations to represent their ethnic groups provided a good instrument for
participating in the international conferences of the movement (renamed as the
International Federation of League of Nations societies, Union Internationale des
Associations pour la Société des Nations; UIA), which annually hosted representatives
from all over the world. The first president of the organisation, French law professor
Théodore Ruyssen, was himself a defender of minority interests and advocated a
liberal concept of the nation based on the will of the people. Some British and
continental champions of minorities had a prominent role in the UIA as well. Liberal
MP Lord Willoughby Dickinson and the Dutch feminist and pacifist activist Christina
Bakker van Bosse paved the way for the active commitment of the UIA to improving
and expanding Minorities Treaties. The UIA even issued a bulletin devoted to the
minority question in 1928–29.22 This turned the organisation into an interesting
platform for representatives of nationalities and national minorities, who saw the
Union as an appropriate place for gaining visibility and respectability alike. The
UIA set up an advisory body on national minorities alongside similar organs – often
with the same protagonists – established by the Interparliamentary Union, the World
Alliance for the International Friendship through the Churches and the International
Law Association. These attempted to play an avant-garde role in the emerging field of
minority law. They also served as informal advisers to certain governments, although
they were usually met with indifference by the League of Nations.23
A second group was composed of the powerful propaganda network of British,
French and eastern European Zionists acting through the Committee of Jewish
Delegations, which was established in Paris in 1919 as an umbrella office for
coordinating démarches to favour the interests of Jewish minorities from east-central
Europe on the international scene. The Committee also followed up on Jewish
minorities’ petitions to the Secretariat of the League of Nations and established
regular contacts with political and cultural representatives of other ethnic minorities
covered by the Treaties, in part thanks to the activity of its representative, the Kiev-
born Zionist exile Leo Motzkin.24
A third network involved transnational organisations representing German national
minorities from various east-central European states. The most representative, the
22 See Théodore Ruyssen, Les minorités nationales d’Europe et la guerre mondiale (Paris: Presses universitaires
de France, 1924); Willoughby H. Dickinson, ‘Les Traités des Minorités’, Les Minorités Nationales, II,
1–2 (1929); idem, Minorities (London: League of Nations Union, 1928). See also René Fabre, ‘Un
exemple de pacifisme juridique. Thédore Ruyssen et le mouvement “La Paix par le Droit” (1884–
1950)’, Vingtième Siècle, 39 (1993), 38–54.
23 See Núñez Seixas, Entre Ginebra y Berlín, 208–25; Daniel Gorman, ‘Ecumenical Internationalism:
Willoughby Dickinson, the League of Nations and the World Alliance for Promoting International
Friendship through the Churches’, Journal of Contemporary History, 45 (2010), 51–73 and Stefan Dyroff,
‘Avant-Garde or Supplement? Advisory Bodies of Transnational Associations as Alternatives to the
League’s Minority Protection System, 1919–1939’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 24 (2013), 192–208.
24 Fran Nesemann, ‘Minderheitendiplomatie. Leo Motzkin zwischen Imperien und Nationen’, in Dan
Diner, ed., Synchrone Welten. Zeitenräume jüdischer Geschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
2005), 147–74.
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Union of German Minorities in Europe (Verband der Deutschen Minderheiten in
Europa; VDM), was founded in Vienna in October 1922 and directly supported
by the government in Berlin. It incorporated delegates from most moderate German
minority parties in east-central Europe, and at its forefront were some Baltic German
leaders who were in favour of achieving an enduring agreement with ethnic majorities
in the states in which they lived, based on the mutual recognition of cultural autonomy
for minorities and loyalty to the state.25 With discreet support from the governments
of their respective motherlands, representatives of Hungarian and Polish minorities
took similar initiatives, usually by means of the establishment of a delegation in
Switzerland.
In fact, a dense network of institutes, associations and journals seeking to defend
the rights of ‘Germans abroad’ (Auslandsdeutsche) supported a mid-range revision of
the borders that had been drawn at Versailles. They set the German appeal in the
context of a larger claim for national self-determination for European minorities.
Most German minority leaders were increasingly drawn to radical nationalist ideas
but also wanted to enlarge the League of Nations Minority Treaties to include all
member states, as a step towards the eventual revision of European borders according
to the nationality principle. They also pressed the League of Nations to expand the
rights granted to ethnic groups by the Treaties. During the 1920s calls to generalise
the Minority Treaties and make them more functional became common slogans for
most ethno-nationalist and minority émigrés in Europe.26
Thus, short-term strategic interests of some ethno-nationalist émigrés and
revisionist states could overlap at times. The German völkisch organisations and their
mouthpieces, as well as certain revisionist authors who were fiercely committed to
defending the rights of Germans abroad, embraced the concept of Wilsonian self-
determination. They ignored its most radical democratic side and soon realised that
promoting the ethnic deconstruction of Europe went hand in glove with their national
interests.27 Unsurprisingly, some völkisch journals that championed the cause of
German minorities abroad also devoted enthusiastic articles to the home rule demands
of the Scots, the Bretons and the Flemish. Some völkisch radical activists also attempted
to found committees representing oppressed nations, where German minority leaders
would supposedly cooperate with the exiles of western European nationalities and
even anti-colonialist leaders from Egypt or India. A good example is found in the
25 See Núñez Seixas, Entre Ginebra y Berlín, 286–93 and John Hiden, ‘Der Verband der Deutschen
Minderheiten in Europa 1922–1936: Von der Verteidigung der deutschen Minderheiten zum Werkzeug
des Nationalsozialismus’, in Baar and Dyroff, eds., Politische Strategien, 297–308.
26 See the contemporary account by Paul Lévy, Le germanisme à l´étranger (Strasbourg: Comité Alsatien
d‘Études et Information, 1933), 103–50; as well as Rudolf Jaworski, ‘Der Auslandsdeutschegedanke
in der Weimarer Republik’, Annali dell’Istituto Storico Italo-Germanico in Trento, IV (1978), 223–50 and
Gerhard Seewan, ‘Mehrheits- und Minderheitsstrategien und die Frage der Loyalität 1919–1939’, in
Baar and Dyroff, Politische Strategien, 15–26.
27 Bastiaan Schot, Nation oder Staat? Deutschland und der Minderheitenschutz. Zur Völkerbundpolitik in der
Stresemann-Ära (Marburg a. Lahn: Herder Institut, 1988). See also Kurt Trampler, Staaten und nationale
Gemeinschaften. Eine Lösung des europäischen Minderheitenproblems (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1929); idem
and Karl Haushofer, eds., Deutschlands Weg an der Zeitenwende (Munich: Hugendubel Verlag, 1931).
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various ‘committees of violated peoples’ supported by the Hungarian government
during the early 1920s. Projects were put forward by the Viennese Law Professor
Viktor Otte, who in 1925 attempted to hold in Berlin a conference of oppressed
peoples ranging from German minorities in Romania to Armenians and Afghans.
Around the same date, völkisch activists in Berlin sponsored the secretive ‘Committee
of Oppressed Peoples’ and invited some exiled Catalan nationalists to attend.28
The best example of joint cooperation between the political representatives of
the German, Jewish, Magyar and Slavic minorities covered by the Minority Treaties,
along with Catalan nationalists and other groups, was the Congress of European
Nationalities (CEN), which remained active from 1925 to 1939. Founded in Geneva
as a joint endeavour of Zionist leaders and émigrés, German minority leaders,
Slavic and Magyar leaders and exiled Catalanists, the CEN attempted to consolidate
itself as the main mediator between the European minorities and state diplomatic
corps. It gradually came under the influence of the völkisch-oriented leaders of
German national minorities, while liberal leaders left the organisation or were simply
marginalised. This unstable alliance suffered from several fractures, yet developed a
theoretical model for solving the nationality question in interwar Europe. The model
was built on the doctrines of non-territorial autonomy inherited from Austrian
social democracy, the experiences of the Estonian law of cultural autonomy that was
implemented in 1925, the self-governing tradition of Jewish communities in east-
central Europe and the corporatist autonomy of German minorities in the same
area. However, the CEN leadership could not evade the growing rift between
pro-democratic, anti-fascist factions and pro-authoritarian nationalists throughout
the 1930s. Some factions of the German minorities’ leadership had developed a
democratic-oriented, anti-fascist theory of national belonging that was permeated
by a radical belief in European unity and clear rejection of National Socialism and
anti-Semitism.29
The fourth group consisted mainly of modest bureaus established by ethno-
nationalist movements without motherlands, such as the Irish Bureaus in Paris and
other capitals at the beginning of the 1920s. They also established some contacts
with substate nationalists from France and Spain, particularly Catalans and Basques.30
28 On Otte’s and Hungarian-sponsored projects, see Núñez Seixas, Entre Ginebra y Berlín, 325–7; Daniel
Cardona, La Batalla i altres textos, E. Ucelay-Da Cal, ed. (Barcelona: La Magrana/Diputació de
Barcelona, 1984), 113–5; as well as Viktor Otte, Die unterdrückten Völker der Welt: Gegen Lüge und
Gewalt (Vienna: Ostmarken-Verlag, 1926).
29 On the origins and evolution of the CEN, see Núñez Seixas, Entre Ginebra y Berlín, 16–447; as well as
an exhaustive description in Sabine Bamberger-Stemmann, Der Europäische Nationalitätenkongreß 1925
bis 1938. Nationale Minderheiten zwischen Lobbyistentum und Großinteressen (Marburg a. Lahn: Herder
Institut, 2000). See also Martyn Housden, ‘Ewald Ammende and the Organization of National
Minorities in Interwar Europe’, German History, 18 (2000), 439–60.
30 See Dermoth Keogh, ‘The origins of the Irish Foreign Service in Europe (1919–1922)’, Études
Irlandaises, 8 (1982), 145–64. On the links between the Irish nationalists and Catalan, Basque and
Galician nationalists, see Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, ‘El mito del nacionalismo irlandés y su influencia en
los nacionalismos gallego, vasco y catalán (1880–1936)’, Spagna Contemporanea, 2 (1992), 25–58; as well
as Joan C. Ferrer i Pont, Nosaltres Sols! La revolta irlandesa a Catalunya (1920–1923) (Barcelona: PAM,
2007).
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Other examples include the Macedonian nationalist clubs in Vienna, the Ukrainian
exiles in Paris and the Armenian associations in France and other countries.31 Many
of these relied on the support of their migrant diasporas as they attempted to access
the ministries of foreign affairs in their host countries and gain the attention of
international public opinion regarding the fate of their respective homelands.
The new émigrés included party leaders, elected deputies and senators and
representatives of cultural associations and institutions from national minorities
scattered all over Europe. After 1919 they attempted to join some of the pre-existing
international networks set up by liberal internationalists, the peace movement and the
emerging League of Nations movement. Certainly, not all of them were anti-fascists,
and even fewer were fully convinced democrats. In fact, most east-central European
émigrés were full-fledged anti-communists. Many shared anti-Semitic attitudes and
sentiments with radical völkisch nationalists in Germany and found it convenient to
look for support from Mussolini’s Italy after 1925. One example was the Macedonian
para-terrorist organisation, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation
(IMRO). Similarly, several Ukrainian émigrés belonging to the Organisation of
Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) found shelter in Weimar Germany, where they
developed links to several völkisch organisations and the National Socialist Party prior
to 1933.32
Ukrainian nationalists, particularly those who left the country during the 1930s
due to the repression policy of the Piłsudski regime, were joined by Hungarians
from Transylvania who had been forced into exile by the Romanian government and
the fascist Iron Guard. They embraced revisionist principles and received financial
assistance from Budapest. Gustave de Köver, the former deputy of the Hungarian
Party in Romania, founded in Geneva the Central Bureau for Minorities (Bureau
Central des Minorités), which set up delegations in Paris and in London (from 1938 on)
with the cooperation of some exiled Ukrainians. It sought to mediate in the Magyar
and central European minority petitions to the League of Nations while seeking
international visibility for the cause of Transylvanian Magyars. With this purpose, the
Bureau also published the monthly transnational review Minorité-La voix des peuples.33
The rhetoric of national rebirth, its enhancement of the national interest as
the supreme social value and the relevance of nationalist rituals for the Nazi and
31 Stefan Troebst, ‘Wien als Zentrum der mazedonischen Emigration in den Zwanziger Jahren’,
Mitteilungen des bulgarischen Forschungsinstituts in Österreich, II, 2 (1979), 68–86; A. Ter-Minassian,
Histoires croisées. Diaspora, Arménie, Transcaucasie, 1880–1990 (Paris: Éditions Parenthèses, 1997), 25–66;
Jean-Bernard Dupont-Melnyczenko, Les Ukrainiens en France. Mémoires éparpillées (Paris: Autrement,
2007), 44–64 and Michael Esch, Parallele Gesellschaften und soziale Räume. Osteuropäische Einwanderer in
Paris, 1880–1940 (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2012), 411–27.
32 See Stefan Troebst, Mussolini, Makedonien und die Mächte, 1922–1930: Die “Innere Makedonische
Revolutionäre Organisation” in der Südosteuropapolitik des faschistischen Italien (Cologne: Böhlau, 1987); as
well as Wolodymir Kosyk, The Third Reich and the Ukraine (New York: Lang, 1993).
33 ‘Au Directeur de la Section des Minorités de la Société des Nations’, Minorité, 1, 5 Jan. 1934; Gustave
de Köver, Non! Genève ne protége pas les minorités nationales (Geneva: Éditions du Bureau central des
minorités, 1934); idem, Histoire d’une trahison: le calvaire des minorités nationales et la Société des Nations
(Geneva: Éditions du Bureau central des minorités, 1939).
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fascist movements exerted some influence on ethno-nationalists from ‘little nations’
with a democratic and even left-wing history.34 The influence was accentuated
among ethno-nationalist leaders that shared common elements with fascist parties:
anti-communism, the desire for a mobilisation of militarised youth on behalf of
the nation, anti-Semitism or a preference for a corporatist model of society. In
fact, most east-central European nationalist émigrés had many points in common
with the authoritarian state-led nationalisms. In spite of this they also played the
card of cultivating the friendship of liberal humanitarians and sought the attention
of British liberal minority champions. Some British Labour and Liberal MPs
committed themselves to defending the claims of the Ukrainian minorities from
Poland, the Hungarians from Romania or the Macedonians and Croats that had
come from Yugoslavia. They sought to raise parliamentary questions that would
force the government in London to adopt a pro-minorities stance in the League
of Nations. Notably, Sir Noel-Buxton and Sir Willoughby Dickinson promoted
solidarity campaigns in favour of specific national minorities.35
IV
Although it could be seen as a contradiction, French liberal and humanitarian
internationalists also embraced the claims of European national minorities during
the 1920s, so long as they did not involve any threats to the territorial integrity
of France. Platforms could be found with links to the political factions of the
French liberal left, such as the journal Le Cri des Peuples, edited by Bernard Lecache.
This Jewish lawyer of Ukrainian origin and left-wing, communist leanings, who
was also a free mason and a great admirer of the Soviet Union, was committed
to defending the rights of the Jewish minorities in east-central Europe. After the
Schwartzbard trial in Paris, he promoted the League against Pogroms (Ligue contre les
Pogroms) established in 1927, which in 1928 became the International League against
Anti-Semitism (Ligue Internationale contre l’Antisémitisme), and, later, the International
League against Racism and Anti-Semitism (Ligue Internationale contre le Racisme et
l’Antisémitisme) in 1932, which still exists today.36 A mixture of aesthetic avant-garde,
revolutionary rhetoric and petty-bourgeois non-conformism, the mouthpiece Le Cri
34 Thus, some Catalanist intellectuals could not escape feeling attracted by Fascist Italy in the mid-1920s.
See Enric Ucelay-Da Cal, ‘The Shadow of a Doubt: Fascist and Communist Alternatives in Catalan
Separatism, 1919–1939’, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, WP 198 (Barcelona: Institut de Ciéncies
Polítiques i Socials, 2002).
35 Stefan Dyroff, ‘Minority rights and Humanitarianism. The international campaign for the Ukrainians
in Poland, 1930–31’, Journal of Modern European History, 12 (2014), 216–30. See several examples in
Lord Noel Noel-Buxton, National Minorities To-day (London: The Ukrainian Bureau, 1931); Robert
Gower, The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States (London: Grant Richards, 1927) and H. Hessel
Tiltman, Peasant Europe (London: Kegan Paul, 2005 [1934]).
36 See Emmanuel Debono, ‘Les origines de la Ligue internationale contre le racisme
et l’antisémitisme (LICRA)’, Histoire@Politique 2/2007, available at: http://www.cairn.info/
revue-histoire-politique-2007-2-page-8.html (last visited ); as well as idem, ‘Bernard Abraham Lecache,
président fondateur de la Ligue internationale contre l’antisémitisme’, Archives Juives, 40, 1 (2007),
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des Peuples was first published as a weekly and later as a monthly journal between
May 1928 and April 1929. Among its varied contributors were the British writer and
member of the socialist-oriented Fabian Society H. G. Wells, the French communist
writer Henri Barbusse and the physicist Albert Einstein, alongside the Catalanist
leader Francesc Macià, the Italian socialist Filippo Turati and the former Portuguese
President Bernardino Machado. From the very first issue the journal proclaimed its
aim of providing a ‘platform of solidarity’ for the ‘national, philosophic and religious
minorities’ around the globe, to which a ‘French minority’ of pacifists and anti-
militarist activists could also be added.37 Bernard Lecache welcomed in his journal
– which clearly leaned towards the liberal left and the moderate socialists – articles
from diverse ethno-nationalist activists. Contributors ranged from Jewish leaders
to völkisch-inclined German minority leaders such as the Baltic German Werner
Hasselblatt, or even Hungarian deputies from Transylvania.
Le Cri des Peuples’ commitment to national minorities reflected its liberal humanist
stance. It held that weak individuals, groups and minorities should be protected
from states and gave priority to freedom of conscience and speech over all other
matters. This did not necessarily mean that the journal embraced the nationality
principle.38 Accordingly, Lecache positioned himself in favour of home-rule for
Alsace-Lorraine but kept silent about nationality claims within France. Le Cri des
Peuples especially welcomed the cause of exiled Catalan nationalists but disapproved
of Flemish nationalist aims at independence. Lecache himself was connected to the
Committee of Jewish Delegations and especially committed to the cause of some
eastern European nationalities. He advocated the revision of the 1919 borders and
the independence of Macedonia, Ireland and Montenegro.39 The journal also took
great interest in the evolution of the minority question in the League of Nations.
Beginning in June 1928 a variety of minority leaders wrote articles in Le Cri des
Peuples, including the Catalanist lawyer Francesc Maspons i Anglasell, the Baltic
German politicians Werner Hasselblatt and Paul Schiemann, the Hungarians Géza
Szüllö (a deputy in the Czechoslovak parliament) and Elémer Jakabffy, publisher of
the transnational minority journal Glasul Minoritatilor-Die Stimme der Minderheiten-La
voix des minorités in Lugoj, Transylvania.40
Though Le Cri des Peuples was well received by many intellectuals of the French
socialist and communist left, it certainly maintained controversial positions on some
international issues. It embraced the views of the German minorities organisations,
openly advocating the unification of Germany and Austria (Anschluß).41 Although
140–4; idem, Aux origines de l’antiracisme. La LICA, 1927–1940 (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 2012) and
Esch, Parallele Gesellschaften, 433–7.
37 Bernard Lecache, ‘À tous! à tous!’, Le Cri des Peuples, 30 May 1928.
38 G. Renard, ‘Pourquoi et dans quelle mesure nous défendrons les minorités’, Le Cri des Peuples, 30
May 1928.
39 Bernard Lecache, ‘Notre programme’, Le Cri des Peuples, 6 June 1928.
40 See, for example, Le Cri des Peuples, 11 July 1928; letter from Bernad Lecache to Josip Vilfan, Paris,
17 May 1928, Vilfan archive, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
41 See, for example, D. K., ‘Un mouvement qu’on n’arretera pas: c’est l’Anschluss’, Le Cri des Peuples,
15 Aug. 1928.
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the journal publicly identified itself as federalist and not in favour of ethnic separatism,
it published articles that leaned towards sympathy with the Breton nationalist
movement. That, along with its revisionist attitude towards the peace treaties, stirred
up opposing reactions in French public opinion.42 During the second half of 1928
Le Cri des Peuples increasingly reflected the claims and strategic demands put forward
by the European minorities movement.43
Moreover, the journal managed to mobilise support from French politicians in
favour of concrete minority issues. In January 1929 Lecache launched an appeal to
force the League of Nations to intervene in Macedonia and mediate in the Bulgarian,
Yugoslav and Italian interference in the region. As many as twelve left-wing French
parliamentary deputies subscribed to the journal, along with two senators, a number
of prominent intellectuals and journalists, Italian anti-fascists and the Human Rights
League. This was its ideal sphere of action, as a journal that was present among
liberal internationalists, French Socialist and Radical-Socialist Party factions, anti-
fascist and nationalist exile committees, from Catalanists to Egyptian nationalists,
Italian anti-fascists and Hungarians from Transylvania.44 They supported what the
Chinese Kuomintang were fighting for while also backing the 1929 pro-minorities
offensive of German chancellor Gustav Stresemann in the League of Nations and
advocating internal federalism as a formula for coexistence between Flemings and
Walloons in Belgium. There was room for everyone under the banner of ‘oppressed
peoples’.
However, in April 1929 Le Cri des Peuples ceased to exist. The official reason
given was failure to attain more than 2,500 subscribers. Though no evidence of
German financial support has been found, the disappearance of the journal coincided
conspicuously with chancellor Stresemann’s diplomatic offensive in Geneva. But the
Comintern also seems to have endorsed the publication.
The French radical federalists created a different platform. The Parisian federalist
group headed by Eugène Poitevin had ties with Breton, Corsican and Alsatian
autonomists. He edited the journal Le Fédéraliste between 1921 and 1938, as the voice
of the Foyer d’Études Fédéralistes, which leaned towards ‘syndicalist’ revolutionary
groups. To a certain extent Le Fédéraliste waved the banner of the nationality
principle as a principle to be embraced by the French liberal left from the early
1930s on. This showed up in its commitment to the federalist claims put forward by
substate nationalist groups in France and its support for anti-fascist Italian exiles,
particularly the liberal-socialist group Justice and Freedom (Giustizia e Libertà).
Poitevin’s Proudhonian federalism in conjunction with the corporatism embraced
by the group Ordre Nouveau prevented Le Fédéraliste from succumbing to the fatal
attraction of fascist nationalism that affected several factions of the Breton, Flemish or
Corsican movements.45 Poitevin held the contrary view that a simple pan-European
42 Le Cri des Peuples, 5 Sept. 1928.
43 Bernard Lecache, ‘En suivant les travaux du IVe. Congrés des Nationalités’, Le Cri des Peuples, 5 Sept.
1929.
44 Le Cri des Peuples, 10 Jan. 1929.
45 Le Fédéraliste, 4, 27 (1933).
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federation of states, nationalities and regions would make it possible for the peoples of
Europe to overcome the threat of totalitarianism.46 From 1933 on the CEN showed
increasing affinity with völkisch doctrines and German theories of a new European
order that divided nations and peoples into racial and cultural hierarchies; meanwhile
Parisian federalists proposed as an alternative path the cooperation between left-wing
Catalan and Occitan nationalists during the 1930s.47 Poitevin can be considered an
ideological forerunner of the concept of ‘Europe of the free peoples’, a term coined
thirty years later as a project to create a European federation of stateless nations.
V
In 1933–34 circumstances on the international scene changed dramatically and
affected the space in which ethno-nationalist exiles had to manoeuvre. The rise
of National Socialism in Germany and the authoritarian shift of several states in east-
central Europe (except Czechoslovakia), led to the systematic inclusion of fascist and
right-wing authoritarian tenets in the programmes promoted by the representatives
and political parties of national minorities and stateless nations, from Brittany to the
Ukraine. Some of them even became useful devices for the foreign policy interests of
Nazi Germany, which began to manifest themselves in 1938. The parallel ‘levelling’,
or Nazification (Gleichschaltung), of leading posts in German minority organisations all
over east-central Europe went hand-in-hand with the authoritarian and pro-fascist
inclinations of Breton nationalists, Alsatian autonomists and Flemish and Frisian
nationalists. Cooperation with the Germans (or with the Italians in the Corsican case)
was regarded by some substate nationalists as an alternative path to national liberation
and counterbalance to their scant social support up to that time.48 However, three
important exceptions to this trend must be noted.
The first were, again, the dominant branches of the Catalan, Basque and Galician
nationalist exiles’ movements after the defeat of the Spanish Republic in the Civil
War (1936–1939).49 They fled first to Europe – mainly France and Great Britain
– and then to several Latin American countries, giving a distinctive colour to the
entire panorama of Spanish Republican anti-fascism. The Basques gained sympathy
and support among broad sectors of European liberal Catholicism and the moderate
46 See E. Berth, ‘Totalitarisme ou Fédéralisme’, Le Fédéraliste, 2, 41 (1937) and 3, 42 (1937).
47 See, for example, Le Fédéraliste, 1, 28 (1934).
48 See Arzalier , Les perdants; Sébastien Carney, Breiz Atao! Mordrel, Delaporte, Lainé, Fouéré: Une mystique
nationale (1901–1948) (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2015), 189–220; Samuel Goodfellow,
‘From Communism to Nazism: The Transformation of Alsatian Communists’, Journal of Contemporary
History, 27, 2 (1992), 231–58. See also Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, ‘Katalanismus und Faschismus:
Zur Interpretation eines katalanistischen Memorandums an das nationalsozialistische Deutschland’,
Zeitschrift für Katalanistik, 6 (1993), 159–201; as well as idem, Movimientos nacionalistas en Europa. Siglo
XX (Madrid: Síntesis, 2004, 2nd. Ed.), 246–9 and 256–62.
49 It is worth noting that some Catalan, Basque and Galician conservative ethnonationalists also joined
the Francoist side, as they shared with the Spanish traditionalists and Fascists certain values such as
religion, social order and fear of social revolution. See Borja de Riquer, El último Cambó, 1936–1947:
La tentación autoritaria (Barcelona: Grijalbo-Mondadori, 1997).
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left. Their cause had been emphasised by the propaganda of the Spanish Republican
government in its attempt to show the world that socially moderate and strongly
Catholic Basque nationalists also backed the Republic against fascism. The bombing
of the Basque town of Guernica in April 1937 echoed across the international press,
which presented the Basques as the collective victim of fascist terror. The regional
Basque government, constituted in October 1936 under the charismatic leadership
of José Antonio de Aguirre, successfully established international lobbies (such as
the International League of the Friends of the Basques) to promote their claims
and mobilise a relevant part of their migrant diasporas in the Americas.50 However,
previous links to other ‘oppressed nations’ of Europe, particularly the Irish, proved
rather uninteresting.51 Dozens of Basque nationalist exiles joined the Allied war effort
after 1939, both as fighters at the front and as informants for British and US military
intelligence, consciously following the model of the Czechoslovak Legion during the
First World War. Quantitatively, they were far more relevant than Galician nationalists,
who mostly relied on Galician migrant associations based in South America. Their
militant anti-fascism was captured in the cartoons and pictures drawn by their main
leader, the deputy and artist Alfonso R. Castelao. Catalanist exiles, who had seized
the opportunity to leave Catalonia and cross the French border en masse in January
1939, outnumbered Basque and Galician exiles. Unlike the Basques, however, they
were politically very fragmented and played only a minor role in anti-fascist activities.
All three groups of exiled nationalists experienced a first phase of political
radicalisation, which induced them to strive for short-term independence. Though
some – particularly the Basques –were even tempted to collaborate with the Nazis,
ethno-nationalist exiles from Republican Spain mostly remained loyal to democracy
and firmly opposed fascism. They regarded it as a natural enemy to the sovereignty
of a small nation and an outright expression of ‘national-statism’, which meant
annihilating small folk cultures in order to favour large ones. Iberian substate
nationalists tended to seek sympathy and recruit adherents among the same sectors
of international public opinion that supported the cause of the Spanish Republic
abroad. After the Allied victory, they pragmatically advocated restoration of the
Spanish Republic in the short-term, but ultimately desired a new multinational or
confederal Republic.52
50 See an exhaustive description of these lobbying activities in Alexander Ugalde, La Acción Exterior del
Nacionalismo Vasco (1890–1939): Historia, Pensamiento y Relaciones Internacionales (Oñati: Instituto Vasco
de Administración Pública, 1996), 533–606.
51 Irish left-wing parties relied heavily on this past relationship to underscore their sympathy for the
Catholic Basques. Solidarity with the Basque Country may also have played a role for some of the
250 Irish volunteers of the International Brigades, including the young Dubliner Sullivan Prendergast,
who directly joined a company of Basque volunteers (Gudariak). However, mainstream Irish public
opinion supported the Francoist rebels, due to their Catholic devotion. Only one Basque radical
leader, Eli Gallastegi, found shelter in Ireland after 1937, thanks to his prior contacts with Irish
activists. See Daniel Leach, Fugitive Ireland. European Minority Nationalists and Irish Political Asylum,
1937–2008 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2009), 52–60.
52 See Santiago de Pablo, Ludger Mees and José L. Rodríguez Ranz, El péndulo patriótico. Historia del
Partido Nacionalista Vasco, II: 1936–1979 (Barcelona: Crítica, 2001), 75–237; Mercè Morales Montoya,
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A second exception, mentioned earlier, involved certain leaders of the Sardinian
home rule movement, who continued to oppose fascism – especially the island
variant known as ‘Sardo-Fascism’ – and went into exile after dissolving the Sardinian
Action Party (Partito Sardo d’Azione) in December 1925. The charismatic Sardinian
autonomist Emilio Lussu joined the Paris-based group Justice and Freedom and
devoted himself to the anti-fascist cause, giving it priority over territorial claims.
While other autonomist leaders remained politically inactive in Sardinia until 1945,
several of Lussu’s followers took part in anti-fascist agitation in France and Italy. Some
of them also joined the International Brigades to fight for the Spanish Republic.53
A third group consisted of German minority leaders who opposed National
Socialism and tried to reconcile national claims with democracy. The Baltic German
liberal leader Paul Schiemann, for example, had advanced in the mid-1920s a
theoretical model for resolving the minority question at the European level. It
incorporated many elements of the proposal of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer to
denationalise culture by separating the spheres of citizenship and ethnic allegiance.
In other words, the state had to be a-national.54 Though German minority leaders
had widely accepted this theory during the 1920s, the rise of National Socialism
reinforced the national-conservative and völkisch tendency among them. In a speech
given to the VDM in June 1932, some months before the German National Socialists
seized power, Schiemann warned of the ‘new nationalist wave’ breaking across east-
central Europe due to the rise of exclusive state-nationalism in Germany and its
influence on German minority leaders abroad. He argued that Hitler had poisoned
the community life of German minorities abroad by imposing a totalitarian concept
of the ethnically defined People’s Community (Volksgemeinschaft) in Germany that
could be imitated by other majority nationalisms.55 However, the ninth conference
of European Nationalities in Berne (September 1933) revealed the clear dominance
of pro-Nazi views among German minority leaders, who saw the ‘New Germany’
as the great, long-awaited defender of their interests in the international scenario.
After opposing the Nazi-oriented leaders of the German minority of Latvia,
Schiemann found shelter in Vienna. Alongside Eduard Pant, the German Catholic
leader from Poland, and Major Karl Kotska, a Sudeten German, he called a meeting
of German anti-Nazi minority leaders, which took place in the Austrian capital in
February 1937. They insisted on detaching national identity from state allegiance
and denounced the rise of state-led national homogenisation as a threat to individual
and collective freedom for all of east-central Europe. Schiemann established the
La Generalitat de Josep Irla i l’exili polític català (Barcelona: Base, 2009); Xosé M. Núñez Seixas and P.
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53 See Salvatore Cubeddu, Sardisti. Viaggio nel Partito Sardo d’Azione tra cronaca e storia. Vol. 1 (1919–1945)
(Sassari: Edes, 1993), 591–9; as well as Manlio Brigaglia, Emilio Lussi e “Giustizia e Libertà” (Cagliari:
Edizioni della Torre, 1976).
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new German Association for National Reconciliation in Europe (Deutscher Verband
zur nationalen Befriedung Europas) but limited its activities to launching a solidarity
campaign with the Basque people during the Spanish Civil War. In March 1938 the
annexation of Austria to the Third Reich marked an end to this initiative; Schiemann
withdrew to his home in Latvia, where he died six years later.56 His anti-totalitarian
formula for the coexistence of ethnic majorities and minorities within the same state
fell into oblivion for several decades. This would also be the fate of some exiled
Sudeten German Social Democrats, such as Wenzel Jaksch, who was involved in
the Labour and Socialist International. He opposed the Nazis’ growing influence
on Sudeten German politics and went into exile in Poland and London after the
annexation of Bohemia by the Third Reich. Although he maintained close contact
with the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, he always demanded a broad autonomy
for Sudeten Germans in the new Czechoslovakia in order to solve the internal
minority problem, and he continued to claim self-determination for nationalities
as a basis for an enduring peace within a federal Europe. This included ethnic
Germans from east-central Europe. He went back to Germany in 1949 and remained
committed to the cause of Sudeten German refugees and expellees until his death.57
VI
Ethno-nationalist movements in exile and anti-fascism were a marriage of
convenience in interwar Europe. There were certainly many exceptions to the
rule: several groups of nationalist activists prioritised global worldviews over national
liberation. Thus, some communist-leaning Ukrainians in Paris denounced Poland’s
repression of Ukrainian language and culture in eastern Galicia and fiercely rejected
fascism. These Ukrainians also rejected the Promethean movement sponsored by
Poland, which gathered anti-communist nationalist exiles from diverse Soviet
republics.58 However, most nationalist émigrés searched for support abroad and acted
out of strategic pragmatism during their exile: they were only interested in the
great powers. Three strategies were usually applied. The first involved cooperation
with other émigré groups belonging to ‘oppressed nationalities’, which also implied
seeking support from third states able to support their national claims. In fact,
most transnational groups and journals that sought to give voice to minorities and
nationalities were suspected of being financed by state diplomacies. A second option
56 Paul Schiemann, Ein europäisches Problem. Unabhängige Betrachtungen zur Minderheitenfrage (Vienna:
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was to search directly for third-state support, ranging from the Soviet Union to France
or Germany. This required the crucial support of political and cultural mediators
who could influence public opinion in the third state. The third or ‘loyalist’ strategy
prioritised joint action with other opposition groups from the same state, from liberal
democrats to communists, who were usually eager to raise the banner of the freedom
of nationalities. Yet, the Popular Front strategy also subordinated this objective to
the defence of the national independence of nation states.59 The Catalans and the
Sardinians chose this path on several occasions. For the most part, this also meant
postponing the fulfilment of national claims until the ‘oppressor’ regime in the
homeland was defeated. Each national movement, and even each group within it,
chose different and often diverging political agitation strategies in exile, according to
the circumstances that shaped the international political scenario.
Fascism was not a common enemy for ethnic minorities and nationalities all over
Europe. For many ethno-nationalist leaders and intellectuals, it held a degree of
fascination. Although the Italian fascist regime had implemented a policy of brutal
assimilation of their borderland minorities, especially German-speaking South Tyrol,
its policy regarding cultural diversity in other areas, such as Sardinia, featured a high
degree of ambivalence. Similarly, Nazi Germany favoured the recognition of cultural
rights for ‘racially akin’ Danish minorities in Schleswig-Holstein while showing
indifference towards its numerically reduced Slavic minorities in Prussia and Silesia.
Nazi geopolitics welcomed the flag of national self-determination and the redrawing
of national borders in Europe along nationality lines. The great relevance of the
nation in fascist ideology and rituals also attracted populist nationalists from all over
the continent.
However, certain elements surfaced during the 1930s that decreased the attraction
of fascism. First, most minority nationalists from western Europe regarded Italy’s
invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 as clear sign of its imperialist ambitions and of its disregard
for little nations. Second, the intervention of Nazi Germany and Italy in the Spanish
Civil War also revealed the alignment of fascist powers with state nationalism. Third,
the Nazis implemented the first segregationist measures against the Jewish population
in Germany in February 1933, though the impact of those measures was certainly
not uniform throughout Europe. Integralist nationalists from Ukraine, Brittany and
Flanders justified them and felt attracted by the authoritarian tenets of Nazi and fascist
doctrine. Basque, Sardinian and Galician nationalist émigrés, by contrast, considered
fascism to be the worst expression of state-led, centralist and assimilation-oriented
nationalism, which aimed at uprooting their existence as distinctive entities. Even
some German minority leaders denounced fascism as the best incarnation of state
nationalism and, therefore, a threat to the survival of ethnic and cultural diversity in
Europe. In spite of these ambiguities, (ethno-)nationalist liberal and left-wing exiles
made a distinctive contribution to European anti-fascism.
59 See a general overview in Serge Wolikow and Annie Ruget, eds., Antifascisme et nation. Les gauches
européennes au temps du Front populaire (Dijon: EUD, 1998).
